Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy
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ShareCopied to clipboardCentral Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy is a book. It was written by Francesco Lippi and published by Edward Elgar in 1999.
Key facts
- author: Francesco Lippi
- publication date: 1999
- book publisher: Edward Elgar
- book series: unknown
- book subjects: Banks and banking, Central-European Union countries, Monetary policy-European Union countries
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"Central Bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy" is one of the books by Francesco Lippi, books by Edward Elgar and 2,617,384 books in our database.
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